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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DEBORAH WALLACE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20050190-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
:fc "k "k k 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-2(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the magistrate correctly refused to bind over a charge of issuing a bad 
check where the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the Appellee 
committed the charged offense? "The determination of whether to bind a criminal 
defendant over for trial is a question of law. Accordingly, we review that determination 
without deference to the court below." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 1J18, 20 P.3d 300 
(internal citations omitted). This issue was preserved by the magistrate's order 
dismissing the charges (R. 191-88). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory provisions is set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The State appeals the magistrate's refusal to bind over Deborah Wallace on a 
single charge of issuing a bad check, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-505(1), in the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Deborah Wallace was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on or 
about October 10, 2003, with issuing a bad check, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505(1) (counts 1 and 2); communications fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1801 (counts 3 and 4); and 
pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-10-1603 (count 5) (R. 4-1). 
A preliminary hearing was held on April 7, 2004, before the Honorable Steven L. 
Hansen (R. 57-58; 196). After evidence was presented, the magistrate took the matter of 
bindover on all charges under advisement (R. 196: 81-83). Wallace moved to dismiss all 
counts (R. 99-107). Following a hearing, the magistrate issued a memorandum decision 
granting Wallace's motion and dismissing all counts (R. 139; 141-50). 
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The State moved to reconsider the matter, to which a second memorandum 
decision was issued wherein the magistrate found that the State's motion was without 
merit (R. 152-166; 186). 
On January 31, 2005, the magistrate issued its order dismissing all charges (R. 
188-191). The State filed a notice of appeal on February 24, 2005. (R. 193). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Count 21 
On July 18, 2002, Deborah Wallace phoned Sharon Warner, an employee of 
Morris Murdock Travel, and asked Ms. Warner to get eleven tickets for flights the next 
day to Hawaii (R. 196: 46-48). Ms. Warner knew that the Wallace's were planning on 
moving to Hawaii at some point, but she did not know when (R. 196: 51). Ms. Warner 
procured the tickets and Deborah and her husband, George Wallace, brought a check to 
Ms. Warner's home in the amount of $11,496.30 to pay for the tickets (R. 196: 13-14, 47-
49). Although the check was pre-dated July 17, 2002, both parties agreed that the check 
would not be cashed until the following Tuesday (R. 196: 48-49). Ms. Warner testified 
that Deborah told her that she had insufficient funds at the time, but that she would have 
enough money by Tuesday to cover the check (R. 196: 48). 
The following Tuesday, Ms. Warner called the bank but the Wallace's had not 
received the money they were expecting (R. 196: 49-50). Ms. Warner called Deborah in 
1
 The State's Statement of Facts addresses other counts with which Wallace was charged. Since the State is not 
disputing that the evidence regarding those charges was insufficient to bind Wallace over for trial, those facts are not 
relevant and will not be addressed here. (Br. of Applt. at 4-12, 13-14). 
3 
Hawaii and told her that the check would not clear (R. 196: 50). Deborah explained that 
they were still expecting the money any time and to hold off a few more days and call the 
bank again (R. 196: 50). After a few weeks, the check was deposited and returned due to 
insufficient funds (R. 196: 50). 
Morris Murdock Travel turned the check over to its legal department, and Lynette 
Ambrose spoke with Deborah on several occasions regarding the debt (R. 196: 53-54). 
Ms. Ambrose testified that Morris Meetings, a subsidiaiy of Morris Murdock Travel, also 
organized arrangements with the Wallaces again in September 2002 in order to attend a 
Nu Skin convention (R. 196: 54-55). The Wallaces gave Morris Meetings two more 
checks totaling $1,860 for the convention, which were also returned for insufficient funds 
(R. 196: 54). 
Toby O'Bryant, an investigator for Utah County, also testified that the check made 
to Morris Murdock Travel by the Wallaces was returned for insufficient funds (R. 169: 6, 
13). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The magistrate correctly concluded that the State failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to bind count 2 over for trial. In order to bind over Deborah Wallace for trial, 
the State had to produce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that Wallace 
violated Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505(1). 
However, the State failed to produce any evidence that Wallace issued a check as 
defined in Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-104, since the "check" given to Morris 
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Murdock Travel was not payable on demand, making it a promissory note. Accordingly, 
the magistrate correctly refused to bind Wallace over for trial. 
Moreover, the State failed to show probable cause that Wallace knew that the 
"check" would have insufficient funds. In fact, the evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom show that Wallace rightfully believed and expected to receive money 
from investments that would cover the "check" issued to Morris Murdock Travel. 
Accordingly, the magistrate correctly refused to bind Wallace over for trial and Wallace 
requests that this Court uphold that decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MAGISTRATE CORRECTLY REFUSED TO BIND 
WALLACE OVER FOR TRIAL BECAUSE THE STATE 
PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT WALLACE 
COMMITTED A CRIME 
The State acknowledges that it failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that Deborah Wallace committed the offenses charged in counts 1 and 
3-5 (Br. of Applt. at 13-14). The State argues, however, that Wallace's history of debt 
and poor business decisions establishes reasonable belief that Wallace knew that the 
account on which the "check" was written and given to Morris Murdock Travel would 
have insufficient funds on the date the "check" was to be cashed. The State's argument, 
based entirely upon unfounded speculation, is without merit and is not a basis with which 
to overturn the magistrate's ruling since the State failed to produce any evidence that 
Wallace believed there would be insufficient funds to cover the "check" issued to Morris 
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Murdock Travel. In fact, the only evidence the State presented regarding Wallace's 
mental state was that she rightfully believed there would be sufficient funds to cover the 
check. Moreover, the State completely ignores the fact that Wallace's "check" was 
actually a promise to pay, resulting in the State's failure to support an essential element 
of the charged offense. Accordingly, the magistrate correctly declined to bind Wallace 
over for trial. 
A. The Bindover Standard 
At a preliminary hearing, it is the State's burden to produce evidence "sufficient 
for the magistrate to find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, ^ 10, 44 
P.3d 730 (citations omitted). Further, the prosecution must produce believable evidence 
of all the elements of the crime charged to sustain its burden at the preliminary hearing 
stage." Id. (citations omitted). Stated differently, "the prosecution must present 
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief 'that an offense has been committed and 
that the defendant committed it." State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, If 16, 26 P.3d 223 
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
Under the standard set forth in State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300, all the 
evidence and "all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" are to be viewed "in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution." Hawatrneh, 2001 UT 51 at j^ 20 (citing Clark, 2001 
UT 9 at T| 20). If the evidenced gives rise to alternative inferences, but the only 
reasonable inferences support the State's case, the magistrate must bind over the 
defendant. See Clark, 2001 UT 9 at Tf 20. However, if the "evidence is wholly lacking 
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and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
prosecution's claim," the defendant should not be bound over for trial. Schroyer, 2002 
UT26atTJ10. 
B. The State failed to produce evidence that Wallace issued or passed a check to 
Morris Murdock Travel. 
Wallace was charged with issuing a bad check, a violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-505(1). A person is guilty of issuing a bad check if: (1) the person 
"issues or passes a check ... for the payment of money"; (2) the person passes the check 
"for the purpose of obtaining from any person ... any ... property, or thing of value or 
paying for any services..."; (3) the person "know[s] it will not be paid by the drawee"; 
and (4) "payment is refused by the drawee." See U.C.A. § 76-6-505(1). 
The State claims that the only issue before this Court is "whether the evidence was 
sufficient to support a 'reasonable belief that defendant knew the $11,496.30 check to 
Morris Murdock would not be paid" (Br. of Applt. at 16). The State, however, ignores 
Wallace's reply memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss and also ignores the 
magistrates Memorandum Decision, wherein the magistrate found that the so-called 
check should be regarded only as a promise to pay in the future, thereby effectively 
taking this case out of the bad check statute (R. 147). 
The State wholly ignores State v. Bruce, 262 P.2d 960 (Utah 1953), and Howells, 
Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977), and simply passes over the fact that what 
Wallace passed to Sharon Warner was not a check at all, but a promise to pay. The Utah 
Supreme Court held in Howells, Inc., that "[t]he law is that where the maker and payee 
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are aware that there are not funds presently available to pay a check and it is therefore 
post-dated, or agreed to be held, it does not come within the definition of a check, which 
must be payable on demand, but is properly regarded as a promise to pay in the future." 
Id. at 1149-50 (emphasis added). 
The State presented evidence that both Wallace and Ms. Warner, Morris Murdock 
Travel's agent, clearly understood that there were insufficient funds in Wallace's account 
on July 18, 2002 (R. 169: 48). The State also presented evidence that Ms. Warner 
understood that she was not to try to cash the "check" until the following Tuesday (R. 
169: 48). Under the definition of a check set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 70A-3-104, 
what Wallace handed Ms. Warner was not a check at all since it was not payable on 
demand. Therefore, the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that Wallace issued or passed a check, an essential element of section 
76-6-505(1). 
The State takes issue, however, with the magistrate's characterization of 
"misrepresentation" (Br. of Applt. at 18-19). The State asserts that because the 
magistrate applied the incorrect standard, the decision should be reversed (Br. of Applt. at 
19). Even if the magistrate mischaracterized the standard, it is clear that the magistrate 
found that the State presented insufficient evidence that Wallace knew there would be 
insufficient funds to pay the "check." 
For example, the magistrate found that the State presented evidence that Wallace 
expected "to receive a substantial sum of money from an investment and there was no 
evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation" (R. 147). The magistrate 
8 
further found that the State could not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of 
insufficient funds and a failure to pay (R. 146). The State's attack on the magistrate's 
decision is merely one of semantics. By finding that Wallace made no misrepresentation 
to Ms. Warner when she gave her the "check," the magistrate found that Wallace 
rightfully believed that she was expecting to receive money in the near future which 
would cover the "check." Clearly, the magistrate found that the State failed to produce 
sufficient believable evidence that Wallace knew that the funds would be insufficient (R. 
146-47). 
Accordingly, the magistrate correctly determined that the State failed to present 
sufficient evidence to bind Wallace over for trial on count 2. 
C. The State produced believable evidence that Wallace rightfully believed that 
there would be sufficient funds to cover the "check"; however, the state 
produced no evidence that Wallace believed that there would be insufficient 
funds to cover the "check." 
The State asserts that Wallace's history of bad debt should be a basis to provide 
reasonable belief that Wallace knew she would not have sufficient funds to cover the 
"check" written to Morris Murdock Travel on or about July 18, 2002 (Br. of Applt. at 
22). The State further asserts that the magistrate incorrectly switched the burden of proof 
(Br. of Applt. at 20). The State's arguments are unsupportable by its own evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing. 
1. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that 
Wallace rightfully believed money from the investments would cover 
the "check." 
In State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, the Utah Supreme Court combined two similar cases 
where the magistrate applied the directed verdict standard and found the prosecution had 
failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the requisite intent to show a crime had 
been committed. Id. at f^ 18. In both cases, the defendants attempted to cash forged 
checks at local banks mere hours after those checks were reported stolen. Id. at J^ 19. In 
both cases, after brief delays where the tellers did not immediately cash the check and 
said that there were problems with the accounts, the defendants exited the banks 
abandoning the forged checks. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court observed that in both cases, the facts gave rise to two 
alternative inferences. Clark, 2001 UT 9 at ^ 20. The Court stated that the defendants 
"may have simply assumed they had themselves been defrauded and, thus, felt there was 
no reason to take the checks with them." Id. On the other hand, however, the Court 
observed, "one could reasonably infer an intent to defraud," because if the defendants 
were holders in due course, they "would have waited for approval rather than leaving" 
the bank after a short delay. Id. Moreover, both defendants "presented checks only hours 
after the reported thefts." Id. 
While the Court found that the facts gave rise to two different inferences, it found 
that the only reasonable inference was the one the prosecution was supporting. See 
Clark, 2001 UT 9 at j^ 20. Since the only reasonable inferences supported a probable 
cause finding of guilt, the Court found sufficient evidence to bind over the defendants. 
Id. 
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The present case is distinguishable form Clark. Here, the State failed to produce 
sufficient believable evidence that Wallace knew that there would be insufficient funds to 
cover the "check" by the following Tuesday. In fact, the only evidence the State 
presented regarding Wallace's mental state was evidence by way of Ms. Warner. Ms. 
Warner testified that Wallace believed she would have sufficient funds by the following 
Tuesday to cover the "check" made out on July 18, 2002 (R. 169: 48-50). Not at any 
point during Ms. Warner's or any other witnesses' testimony did anyone testify that 
Wallace knew or believed that there would be insufficient funds on the following 
Tuesday to cover the "check." Moreover, Ms. Warner testified that Wallace explained 
that she was expecting an investment to come through to pay for the "check" (R. 169: 50, 
52). Not one witness testified that Wallace lied. Therefore, there is a complete lack of 
evidence relative to a necessary element of the charge. 
The State attempts to infer that Wallace knew there would be insufficient money 
by claiming that over two and one-half years, 254 checks were issued by the Wallaces 
which were returned for insufficient funds (Br. of Applt. at 22). However, Mr. O'Bryant 
lacked specific knowledge as to the details of who wrote the checks, what was ultimately 
paid, or the reasons for the overdrafts (R. 169: 21-22). The State also attempts to prove 
Wallace's mental state by lambasting her history of debt and financial difficulties through 
repeating in the Statement of Facts the circumstances surrounding the other charges 
which were properly dismissed (Br. of Applt. at 4-12). The mere accusation that the 
Wallaces have had financial difficulties in the past is insufficient believable evidence to 
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establish that they were not expecting to receive sufficient money to cover the "check" 
issued to Morris Murdock Travel. 
The bulk of the State's brief is an attempt to discredit Wallace and her financial 
history, believing this will provide reasonable belief that Wallace knew that a particular 
investment would not come through. The State incorrectly asserts that "[n]one of 
defendants' purported expectations produced any payments to their victims, nor did any 
proceeds from their purported ventures protect his bank accounts from involuntary 
closures" (Br. of Applt. at 25). As the record shows, the Wallaces have in fact fulfilled 
most of their obligations, although some took longer than they expected. 
The State presented no evidence that Wallace knew there would be insufficient 
funds to cover the "check." In fact, the State presented no evidence regarding the 
investments that Wallace was relying upon. The State could have easily investigated the 
investments Wallace was referring to in order to determine whether there was a 
reasonable basis to believe that she would have sufficient funds to cover the "check." 
Instead, the State relied solely upon unfounded inferences that because the Wallaces had 
had financial problems in the past, Wallace knew that there would be insufficient funds to 
cover the "check." The magistrate correctly determined that these unfounded inferences 
were insufficient to show that Wallace knew that the money would not be there. 
Like Clark, the facts in this case give rise to two alternative inferences. Either 
Wallace knew that there really was no investment mone> coming, or Wallace rightfully 
believed that money would be coming from the investments sufficient to cover the 
"check." However, unlike Clark, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the 
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State's own evidence supports the fact that Wallace believed she would be getting 
enough money from the investments to cover the "check." Since there is only one 
reasonable inference to be made, Clark required the magistrate to refuse to bind over 
Wallace for trial. 
2. The State is seeking to absolve itself from its duty to present sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable belief that Wallace knew that the 
"check" would bounce. 
The State asserts that "[t]he magistrate misapprehended the prosecution's burden 
at the bindover stage and its duty to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences from 
that evidence favorably to the prosecution" (Br. of Applt. at 21). The State further asserts 
that the magistrate assigned to the State the burden of disproving Wallace's defense (Br. 
of Applt. at 20). The State is simply incorrect, and in essence, is asserting that its only 
burden at a preliminary hearing regarding a charge under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
505(1) is to show that a check was issued and there were insufficient funds to pay the 
check. 
In an effort to hide the fact that the State failed to meet its burden regarding intent, 
the State asserts that the magistrate should ignore the fact that Wallace believed she 
would be receiving sufficient money to cover the "check" issued to Morris Murdock 
Travel (Br. of Applt. at 21). The State argues that the duty to "view evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution" means to ignore reasonable inferences favoring the 
defense. For example, the State argues that because the defense "proffered no evidence 
that the Wallaces were expecting a large sum of money," the fact that the State's own 
witness testified that Wallace was expecting such money "should have played no role in 
n 
the magistrate's refusal to bind defendant over" (Br. of Applt. at 21). The State forgets, 
however, that no evidence was put forth showing that Wallace knew that the investments 
would not cover the "check." 
The State's assertion that it had to disprove Wallace's defense is also incorrect. 
Wallace put on no evidence at the preliminary hearing, nor was the issue of a defense 
before the magistrate. The issue was whether the State met its burden by establishing 
probable cause as to every element of the charges. In order to establish that a crime 
occurred under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505(1), the State must present evidence 
sufficient to support a reasonable belief that Wallace knew there were insufficient funds 
to cover the "check." 
Essentially, the State is seeking to relieve itself from the burden of showing 
Wallace's mental state with regards to section 76-6-505(1). The State put on no evidence 
that Wallace knew the money would not be there; however, the State asserts that because 
Wallace gave a "check" with insufficient funds at the time the "check" was issued, and 
because she had a troubled financial history, that is a sufficient mens rea showing of 
probable cause that Wallace knew the "check" would bounce. 
If such a position were adopted, any time a person issued a check and it bounced, 
that would be all a prosecutor needs to bind a defendant over for trial. Fortunately, such 
is not the requirement under section 76-6-505(1). 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Wallace asks this Court to uphold the magistrate's 
decision. 
th RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12m day of December, 2005 
Aaron P. Dodd 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
7Q-6-501 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 34& 
(2) The Legislature finds that the release of fur-bearing 
&#imals raised for commercial purposes subjects the animals 
to unnecessary suffering through deprivation of food and 
shelter and compromises their genetic integrity, thereby per-
manently depriving the owner of substantial value. 1997 
P A R T S 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. F o r g e r y — "Wri t ing" d e n n e d . 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud 
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority 
or ut ters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so tha t the 
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentica-
tion, issuance, transference, publication or utterance pur-
ports to be the act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed 
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than 
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no 
such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording valuable information memdihg forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
t rademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, 
privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument 
or writing issued by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim 
against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim 
against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 1996 
76*6-502. P o s s e s s i o n of forged w r i t i n g o r d e v i c e for 
w r i t i n g — Pena l ty . 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly pos-
sesses any writing that is a forgery as defined in Section 
76^6-501, or who with intent to defraud knowingly possesses 
any device for making any writing that is a forgery as defined 
in Section 76-6-501, is guilty of a third degree felony. 2001 
76*6-503. F r a u d u l e n t h a n d l i n g of r e c o r d a b l e w r i t i n g s . 
(1) Any person who with intent to deceive or injure anyone 
falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any will, deed, mort-
gage, security instrument, or other writing for which the law 
provides public recording is guilty of fraudulent handling of 
recordable writings. 
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings is a felony of 
th% third degree. 1973 
76-.6-504. T a m p e r i n g wi th records. 
(1) Any person who, having no privilege to do so, knowingly 
falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any writing, other 
ths,n the writings enumerated in Section 76-6-503, or record, 
public or private, with intent to deceive or injure any person or 
to Conceal any wrongdoing is guilty of tampering with records. 
(2) Tampering with records is a class B misdemeanor. 1973 
76-.6-505. I s s u i n g a bad check or draft — Presumption. 
(l) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the 
payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any 
pei-son, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, 
or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, 
salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee 
arid payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing 
b$d check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a ched 
or draft for which payment is refused by the drawee j 
Presumed to know the check or draft would not be paid if ^ 
ha.d no account with the drawee at the time of issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for tL 
Payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from an\ 
person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property 
or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages 
salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft ^ 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check 
or draft if he fails to make good and actual payment to the 
pa.yee in the amount of the refused check or draft within 14 
days of his receiving actual notice of the check or draft's 
nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be 
punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts 
made or drawn in this state within a period not exceeding 
six months amounts to a sum that is less than $300, the 
offense is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or 
drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six 
months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $300 but is 
less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or 
drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six 
months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third 
degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or 
drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six 
months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $5,000, the 
offense is a second degree felony. 1995 
76-6-506. F i n a n c i a l transact ion card offenses — Defi-
n i t i o n s . 
t o r purposes of this part: 
(1) "Authorized credit card merchant" means a person 
as defined in Section 68-3-12 who is authorized by an 
issuer to furnish money, goods, services, or anything else 
of value upon presentation of a financial transaction card 
by a card holder and to present valid credit card sales 
drafts to the issuer for payment. 
(2) "Automated banking device" means any machine 
which, when properly activated by a financial transaction 
card or a personal identification code, may be used for any 
of the purposes for which a financial transaction card may 
be used. 
(3) "Card holder" means any person or organization 
named on the face of a financial transaction card to whom 
or for whose benefit a financial transaction card is issued 
by an issuer. 
(4) "Credit card sales draft"means any sales slip, draft, 
or other written or electronic record of a sale of money, 
goods, services, or anything else of value made or pur-
ported to be made to or at the request of a card holder with 
a financial transaction card, financial transaction card 
credit number, or personal identification code, whether 
the record of the sale or purported sale is evidenced by a 
sales draft, voucher, or other similar document in writing 
or electronically recorded and transmitted. 
(5) "Financial transaction card" means: 
(a) any credit card, credit plate, bank services 
card, banking card, check guarantee card, debit card, 
telephone credit card, or any other card, issued by an 
issuer for the use of the card holder in obtaining 
money, goods, services, or anything else of value on 
credit, or in certifying or guaranteeing to a person or 
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(g) "Ordinary care" in the case of a person engaged in 
business means observance of reasonable commercial 
standards, prevailing in the area in which the person is 
located, with respect to the business in which the person 
is engaged. In the case of a bank tha t takes an instrument 
for processing for collection or payment by automated 
means, reasonable commercial standards do not require 
the bank to examine the instrument if the failure to 
examine does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures 
and the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from 
general banking usage not disapproved by this chapter or 
Title 70A, Chapter 4, Uniform Commercial Code — Bank 
Deposits and Collections. 
(h) "Party" means a party to an instrument. 
(i) "Promise" means a written undertaking to pay 
money signed by the person undertaking to pay. An 
acknowledgment of an obligation by the obligor is not a 
promise unless the obligor also undertakes to pay the 
obligation. 
(j) "Prove" with respect to a fact means to meet the 
burden of establishing the fact as defined in Subsection 
70A-1-20K8). 
(k) "Remitter" means a person who purchases an in-
strument from its issuer if the instrument is payable to an 
identified person other than the purchaser. 
(2) Other definitions applying to this chapter and the sec-
tions in which they appear are: 
(a) "Acceptance," Section 70A-3-409; 
(b) "Accommodated party," Section 70A-3-419; 
(c) "Accommodation party," Section 70A-3-419; 
(d) "Alteration," Section 70A-3-407; 
(e) "Anomalous indorsement," Section 70A-3-205; 
(f) "Blank indorsement," Section 70A-3-205; 
(g) "Cashier's check," Section 70A-3-104; 
(h) "Certificate of deposit," Section 70A-3-104; 
(i) "Certified check," Section 70A-3-409; 
(j) "Check," Section 70A-3-104; 
(k) "Consideration," Section 70A-3-303; 
(1) "Demand draft," Section 70A-3-104; 
(m) "Draft," Section 70A-3-104; 
(n) "Holder in due course," Section 70A-3-302; 
(o) "Incomplete instrument," Section 70A-3-115; 
(p) "Indorsement," Section 70A-3-204; 
(q) "Indorser," Section 70A-3-204; 
(r) "Instrument," Section 70A-3-104; 
(s) "Issue," Section 70A-3-105; 
(t) "Issuer," Section 70A-3-105; 
(u) "Negotiable instrument," Section 70A-3-104; 
(v) "Negotiation," Section 70A-3-201; 
(w) "Note," Section 70A-3-104; 
(x) "Payable at a definite time," Section 70A-3-108; 
(y) "Payable on demand," Section 70A-3-108; 
(z) "Payable to bearer," Section 70A-3-109; 
(aa) "Payable to order," Section 70A-3-109; 
(bb) "Payment," Section 7CA-3-G02; 
(cc) "Person entitled to enforce," Section 70A-3-301; 
(dd) "Presentment," Section 70A-3-501; 
(ee) "Reacquisition," Section 70A-3-207; 
(ff) "Special indorsement," Section 70A-3-205; 
(gg) "Teller's check," Section 70A-3-104; 
(hh) "Transfer of instrument," Section 70A-3-203; 
(ii) "Traveler's check," Section 70A-3-104; 
(jj) "Value," Section 70A-3-303. 
(3) The following definitions in other chapters apply to this 
chapter: 
(e) "Depositary bank," Section 70A-4-105; 
(f) "Documentary draft," Section 70A-4-104; 
(g) "Intermediary bank," Section 70A-4-105; 
(h) "Item," Section 70A-4-104; 
(i) "Payor bank," Section 70A-4-105; 
(j) "Suspends payments," Section 70A-4-104. 
(4) In addition, Chapter 1 contains general definitions and 
principles of construction and interpretation applicable 
throughout this chapter. 1998 
70A-3-104. Negotiable instrument . 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (3) and (4), "negotia-
ble instrument" means an unconditional promise or order to 
pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other 
charges described in the promise or order, if it: 
(a) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is 
issued or first comes into possession of a holder; 
(b) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(c) does not state any other undertaking or instruction 
by the person promising or ordering payment to do any 
act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise 
or order may contain: 
(i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain, or 
protect collateral to secure-payment; 
(ii) an authorization or power to the holder to 
confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral; 
or 
(hi) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for 
the advantage or protection of an obligor. 
(2) "Instrument" means a negotiable instrument. 
(3) An order that meets all of the requirements of Subsec-
tion (1), except Subsection (l)(a), and otherwise falls within 
the definition of "check" in Subsection (6) is a negotiable 
instrument and a check. 
(4) A promise or order other than a check is not an instru-
ment if, at the time it is issued or first comes into possession 
of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however 
expressed, to the effect tha t the promise or order is not 
negotiable or is not an instrument governed by this chapter. 
(5) An instrument is a "note" if it is a promise and is a 
"draft" if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the 
definition of both "note" and "draft," a person entitled to 
enforce the instrument may treat it as either. 
(6) (a) "Check" means: 
(i) a draft, other than a documentary draft, pay-
able on demand and drawn on a bank; 
(ii) a cashier's check or teller's check; or 
(hi) a demand draft, 
(b) An instrument may be a check even though it is 
described on its face by another term, such as "money 
order." 
(7) "Cashier's check" means a draft with respect to which 
the~ drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the 
same bank. 
(8) "Teller's check" means a draft drawn by a bank either on 
another bank, or payable at or through a bank. 
(9) "Traveler's check" means an instrument that: 
(a) is payable on demand; 
(b) is drawn on or payable at or through a bank; 
(c) is designated by the term "traveler's check" or by a 
substantially similar term; and 
(d) requires, as a condition to payment, a countersig-
nature by a person whose specimen signature appears on 
the instrument. 
(10) "Certificate of deposit" means an instrument contain-
ing an acknowledgment by a bank that a sum of money has 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEORGE AND DEBORAH WALLACE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 031403946; 031403948 
Date: November 30, 2004 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court, having reviewed and 
considered all relevant memoranda and hearings, now makes the following ruling: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Counts 1-5 of the Information apply to Defendant, Deborah Wallace. 
2. Counts 6-11 of the Information apply to Defendant, George Wallace. 
3. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 1 with issuing a bad check, a second degree felony, for 
a check that was written to Don Horton in the amount of $13,000 and for a $3,000 check 
written to Edward Martinez. These checks were written on July 17, 2002. Mrs. Wallace 
told both Mr. Horton and Martinez that her account lacked sufficient funds and instructed 
them to wait a few days before cashing the checks, as she was expecting sufficient funds 
to be deposited into her account. However, when the gentlemen attempted to cash the 
checks, there was insufficient funds. 
4. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 2, issuing a bad check, and Mr, Wallace, theft by 
deception, for a check written by Mrs. Wallace to Moms Murdock Travel in the amount 
of approximately $11,000 on July 18, 2002. The check was dated July 17, 2002, and Mr. 
Wallace asked the agent, Sharon Warner, to not cash the check for a few days because 
there was not sufficient funds in the account that the check was drawn on, but that 
sufficient funds were expected to arrive from a business deal. However, the sufficient 
funds did not arrive and the check did not clear. 
5. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 3 and Mr. Wallace in Count 8 for Communication 
Fraud, which involves a transaction between Mrs. Wallace and Catryna Faux. Mrs. Faux 
performed housekeeping services and Mrs. Wallace still owed her about $1,063 in back 
wages. Mrs. Faux testified that while she lived in Springville, Utah she had loaned 
money to Mrs. Wallace on three separate occasions. The first two loans were repaid, but 
the third one, amounting to $1,129.32 was not repaid. Mrs. Faux and her husband then 
voluntarily traveled with Mr. and Mrs. Wallace to Hawaii, with the promise of jobs. 
While in Hawaii the Wallaces borrowed additional money from the Fauxs. 
6. In September 2002, the Wallaces persuaded the Fauxs to attend a NuSkin convention in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Wallaces told the Fauxs that they would pay them $6,000 
when they arrived at the convention, based upon monies the Wallaces were expected to 
receive. When the Fauxs arrived in Utah, they learned the Wallaces did not receive the 
funds and "that it was a big mess." Whereupon the Fauxs moved back to Utah, as they 
could not afford to remain in Hawaii. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Faux testified that 
"I know [the Wallaces] felt bad about not getting the money, and [Mrs. Wallace], you 
know, in good will, said, 'We'll pay you back for those expenses."5 PLH Trans, at 67. 
7. Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 4 and Mr. Wallace in Count 10 for Communication 
Fraud. These charges stem from a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. The 
Wallaces and the Stonelys entered into a contract for the sale of the Stonelys' home. 
However, the defendants became delinquent in payments between September of 1997 and 
June of 2002. hi addition, the defendants also failed to pay property taxes. The Wallaces 
were delinquent in the amount of $57,714.40. As a result of the delinquency, the 
Wallaces signed a warranty deed, deeding the property back to the Stonelys "in payment 
of all monies owing." PLH Trans, at 75. 
8. Mrs. Wallace is charged with Count 5 and Mr. Wallace with Count 11, Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity, to include all other creditors that were not repaid by the Wallaces. 
9. Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 6, theft by deception, for an agreement he entered into 
with Mr. Horton. Mr. Horton loaned the defendant $10,000 to make an investment. The 
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defendant was unable to repay Mr. Horton the principal or interest when the amount came 
due. 
10. Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 9, issuing a bad check. However, the State fails to 
provide the Court with sufficient facts to determine the nature of this charge. 
11. The Preliminary Hearing in this matter was conducted on April 7, 2004, after which the 
Court took the issue of binding over the charges under advisement and to allow counsel 
to brief the issue. 
12. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, whereupon the State filed a motion in 
opposition. Oral Arguments were held on October 19, 2004. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is "ferreting out. . . groundless and improvident 
prosecutions." State v. Virgin, 504 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 ( 2004). In order to bind a defendant 
over at a preliminary hearing, the Court must find that there is probable cause sufficient to 
establish the "crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." Id. 
(citations omitted). "In making a detennination as to probable cause, the magistrate should view 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the 
prosecution." Id. "The defendant should be bound over for trial unless the evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim." Id. The State must present a "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact." State. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 
1995)(citation omitted). 
I. Count 1, issuing a bad check, is dismissed because the checks were not written for value. 
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check for events arising out of 
checks that were written to Mr. Horton and Mr. Martinez on July 17, 2002. To support a charge 
of Issuing a Bad Check, the State must establish that the defendant drafted a check for payment 
with the purpose of receiving something of value knowing that the check would not be honored 
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due to insufficient funds. The State supports its position based upon the insufficient funds. 
However, the State must establish that the checks were written for exchange of value. Issuing a 
check for exchange of value is an essential element that the State must satisfy. The State argued 
that something of value was exchanged because the elimination of debt should be considered 
value. This Court disagrees. The facts of the case clearly show that on July 17, 2002, when Mrs. 
Wallace wrote the checks, neither Mr. Martinez or Horton were given any new value to the 
defendants. See Howell Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977). It was nothing more than a 
promise to pay in the future, without adding new or additional terms to previous agreement that 
arose from the July 2, 2001 transactions. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss Count 1 is 
granted. 
II. Counts 2 & 7, Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the 
State fails to establish misrepresentation by Mrs, Wallace, nor does the State establish 
actual deception by Mr. Wallace. 
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 2, Issuing a Bad Check, and George Wallace is 
charged with Count 7, Theft by Deception, for events arising out of checks that were written by 
Mrs. Wallace to Morris Murdock Travel. The Defendant argues that because Murdock Travel 
agreed to withhold depositing the check for a few days that the check falls out of the definition of 
a check, which must be payable on demand, and that it should be regarded as only a promise to 
pay in the future. The Defendant cites State v. Bruce, 262 P.2d 960 (Utah 1953) in support of her 
position, hi Bruce, the Utah Supreme Court stated that postdated checks did not fall under the 
bad check statute, however, the statute applied if there was misrepresentation made at the time 
the check was written. This Court finds that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to 
establish probable cause to satisfy the essential element of misrepresentation. 
This Court finds that the State supports its motion by showing the defendant wrote the 
checks with the knowledge that there would be insufficient funds based upon the Wallaces' 
history of debt. However, there was ample testimony at the preliminary hearing that the 
Defendants were expecting to receive a substantial amount of money from an investment and 
there was no evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation. The Defendant does 
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not carry the burden at the preliminary hearing to provide evidence of the large payout, but rather 
this burden rests solely upon the State to present some evidence that the Defendant's were 
engaging in fraud by misrepresenting the statement of expecting a substantial sum of money 
arriving from a business deal. The State must establish sufficient evidence that the Wallaces 
were not relying on receiving money themselves in order to provide the sufficient funds. The 
State must provide "some" evidence that Mrs. Wallace's expectation of receiving money was a 
misrepresentation and the State can not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of 
insufficient funds and a failure to pay. 
Moreover, as pertaining to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State is required to establish 
some evidence that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that is false, 
fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct 
that is not true, or promises performances that he does not intend to preform. Here, the State has 
failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact 
that Moms Travel would be repaid. The evidence at the preliminary hearing established that Ms. 
Warner, an employee of Murdock Travel, dealt exclusively with the Defendant's wife and not the 
Defendant. Therefore, since the State is unable to satisfy all elements of the charges, the 
defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 7 is granted. 
HI. COUNT 3 & 8, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State failed to establish 
that the defendants devised a scheme or artifice to defraud the Fauxs of at least $5,000. 
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for 
events arising out of dealings with the Fauxs. To bind over for a charge of Communication 
Fraud, a second degree felony, the State must establish that the defendants devised a scheme or 
artifice to defraud another of at least $5,000 or something other than monetary value, and that the 
events occurred in Utah County, Utah. The State contends that the Fauxs were defrauded out of 
$7,286.83. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Faux testified that in Utah County the following 
debts were made by Mrs. Wallace: $1,129.32 of which Deborah borrowed from Mrs. Faux to pay 
for her son's rent-a-car, and for $1,063 in wages for Mrs. Faux's employment as a housekeeper in 
Springville, Utah. However, based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, the 
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remaining transactions all occurred in Hawaii and not in Utah County, Utah and therefore those 
transactions can not be calculated in the total figure to establish communication fraud. 
Therefore, since the monetary value that was accrued in Utah County, Utah does not exceed 
$5,000 the State is unable to establish probable cause as to all elements of the charge. 
In addition, this Court finds that the debt that accrued in Utah County, Utah does not 
amount to communication fraud. Based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, 
it was established that on previous occasions that the defendants did repay money on previous 
loans they owed the Fauxs, which is contrary to the State's position. Moreover, no testimony 
was presented at the Preliminary Hearing to show that the Wallaces' expectation of funding was 
fraudulent. Since intent to defraud is an essential element of Communication Fraud, and the 
State failed to satisfy this element, this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts 3 
and 8, Communication Fraud. 
IV COUNT 4 & 10, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State has failed to 
establish that the delinquent mortgage and tax payments was an intent to defraud the 
Stonelys. 
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for 
events arising out of a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. To bindover a 
communication fraud the State must satisfy its burden by presenting some evidence of a scheme 
or artifice to defraud another by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises 
or material omissions. However, the State supports its position by claiming that delinquent 
payments is sufficient to establish communication fraud and that the defendants were spending 
money to finish the basement instead of paying their other debts. These assertions are not 
sufficient to satisfy the State's burden. The State fails to present any evidence of a scheme or 
artifice. Moreover, delinquent payments are not sufficient to establish probable cause of an 
intent to defraud. Finally, this Court finds that the fact that the Stonelys executed and recorded, 
through their attorney, a warranty deed expressly satisfying any and all obligations owed by the 
Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's position that the Wallaces intended to defraud 
the Stonelys. Therefore, the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 4 and 10 is granted. 
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V. Counts 5 & 1L Pattern of Unlawful activity, are dismissed because the Wallaces do not 
constitute an enterprise., nor does their conduct constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as 
defined by statute. 
Both defendants are charged with Pattern of Unlawful Activity. To bind over Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity, the State must establish that probable cause exist that the Wallaces constitutes 
an enterprise and of a pattern of unlawful activity. An "enterprise" means any individual, sole 
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any 
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as 
well as licit entities." U.C.A. section 76-10-1602(1). The State contends that the Wallaces 
constitute an enterprise under the statute, but the State fails to articulate how the Wallaces 
constitute an enterprise, other than the mere fact that they are married to each. The State failed to 
present any evidence or authority to establish that a married couple constitutes an enterprise as 
defined by the statute, hi a recent case, the Utah Court of Appeals states that "[a]n 'association 
in fact5 enterprise cis provided by evidence of an ongoing organization formal or informal, and by 
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.'" State v. Bradshaw, 508 
Utah.Adv. Rep. 12, 16 (Utah App. 2004)(citations omitted). An enterprise is a "continuing unit 
for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." State v. McGrath. 749 P.2d 631 
(Utah App. 1988)(stating that the individuals had an ongoing association in fact for the purpose 
of making money with the sale of drugs). The State cites no authority suggesting that marriage 
creates an enterprise. Courts have universally rejected attempts to extend the scope of 
antiracketeering laws and to reject efforts "to dress a garden-variety fraud and deceit case in 
RICO clothing." Bradshaw. 508 Utah.Adv. Rep at 16. This Court finds that the mere fact that 
the Wallaces are married does not constitute an enterprise. It is the conclusion of this Court that 
it was not the legislative intent to include marriages as an enterprise within the scope of the 
statute scheme to constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as contemplate in U.C.A. section 76-
10-1602(1). 
Furthermore, the Wallaces pattern of debt does not constitute unlawful pattern of activity 
as described by the statute. The statute requires at least three episodes of unlawful activity, 
which episodes are not isolated, but are the same or similar. Such activities that are prohibited 
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are theft by deception or communication fraud. However, as stated previously, this Court finds 
that the conduct of the Wallaces do not amount to acts of either commercial fraud or theft by 
deception. Moreover, this Court finds that the defendants did not use or invest the money they 
borrowed in a proscribed manner, as required by the statute. The "language of the statute is clear 
that defendants] must 'use or invest5 the proceeds from the unlawful activity in the proscribed 
manner, namely the 'acquisition,' 'establishment/ or 'operation of an 'enterprise.'" Id.; See 
State v. Bell 770 P.2d 100, 103 n.2 (Utah 1988)("[UPUAA} makes it a crime to use the profits 
of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise."); and Accord State v. 
Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)("A [RICO} violation occurs not when the 
defendant engages in the predicate acts, but only when he uses or invests the proceeds of that 
activity in an enterprise.'")(citation omitted). 
Therefore, this Court grants the Defendants motion to dismiss Counts 5 and 11, Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity. 
VI COUNT 6, Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the State failed to show actual 
deception by the defendant when he persuaded Mr. Horton to loan him SI0,000. 
Theft by deception requires that the State prove the defendant created or confirmed by 
words or conduct a fact that is false, fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created 
or confirmed by words or conduct that is not true, or promises performances that he does not 
intend to preform. The State contends that Mr. Wallace committed a theft by deception by 
entering into an agreement to have Mr. Horton make an investment of $10,000, without 
intending to repay him. However, the only evidence the State presents to support its contention 
is the defendant's failure to repay. The State did not provide any evidence regarding the nature 
of the investment and whether the investment was fraudulent. There was no evidence presented 
to establish whether there was either a fictitious investment project or whether the money was 
actually invested but that the project failed to perform as had been expected by the Defendant. 
The fact that the money was not repaid is insufficient to establish an intent to deceive; the State 
must present some evidence that a "big deal" was not legitimately expected by the defendant and 
that the lack of repayment was not a result of commercial misfortune. Furthermore, there was 
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testimony presented that the agreement between the defendant and Mr. Horton took place 
simultaneously when the defendant and Mr. Martinez entered into the identical agreement. Mr. 
Martinez received full repayment of the loan's principal which supports the position that the 
defendant possessed the intent to repay, rather than to deceive. In addition, there was evidence 
presented at the preliminary hearing that there had been a history of paying debts to Mr. 
Martinez. 
The State failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false 
impression of fact that Mr. Horton would be repaid. Not every unfilled promise is turned into 
deception. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1983). A lack of repayment is insufficient 
to establish probable cause that the defendant intended to defraud either Mr. Horton or Mr. 
Martinez. This Court finds that there lacks probable cause to bindover Count 6 and that this 
charge is dismissed. 
VII The State fails to provide sufficient facts for Count 9, Issuing a Bad Check. 
This issue was not raised in either the State's or the Defendant's motion, nor was it 
discussed in oral arguments. Since this Court was not given sufficient facts to determine the 
nature of this charge, Count 9 is dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the evidence presented to the Court at the Preliminary Hearing; Oral Arguments 
and Memorandums, this Court finds that the State has been unable to establish probable cause for 
each and every element of the charges. Moreover, this Court finds that the State failed to meet its 
burden to show that the defendants conduct raised to the level of theft and fraud, rather than mere 
commercial misfortune. Therefore this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss all 
counts. The Defendants are to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the 
Court's signature. 
On a final note, it appears, based upon the facts of this case and the arguments presented 
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by the State, that the State is making the statement that there should be a policy to criminally 
charge individuals who run into financial difficulties, are unable to pay debts, file for bankruptcy, 
have foreclosed on their mortgage, or who fail to meet their contractual obligations, and that 
these debtors should be subject to criminal sanctions, along with any potential civil actions. In 
these situations, there are often a multitude of unpaid debts to various creditors, however, it is 
clear that the criminal courts are not the proper avenue to deal with these situations, nor should 
they be used to convert ordinary civil debt into criminal restitution. 
DATED this %L day of November, 2004. 
BY THECOURT 
STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE 
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